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Abstract
Background: From June to November 2005, 18 cases of community-acquired Legionnaires'
disease (LD) were reported in Rapid City South Dakota. We conducted epidemiologic and
environmental investigations to identify the source of the outbreak.
Methods: We conducted a case-control study that included the first 13 cases and 52 controls
randomly selected from emergency department records and matched on underlying illness. We
collected information about activities of case-patients and controls during the 14 days before
symptom onset. Environmental samples (n = 291) were cultured for Legionella. Clinical and
environmental isolates were compared using monoclonal antibody subtyping and sequence based
typing (SBT).
Results: Case-patients were significantly more likely than controls to have passed through several
city areas that contained or were adjacent to areas with cooling towers positive for Legionella. Six
of 11 case-patients (matched odds ratio (mOR) 32.7, 95% CI 4.7-∞) reported eating in Restaurant
A versus 0 controls. Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 was isolated from four clinical specimens:
3 were Benidorm type strains and 1 was a Denver type strain. Legionella were identified from
several environmental sites including 24 (56%) of 43 cooling towers tested, but only one site, a small
decorative fountain in Restaurant A, contained Benidorm, the outbreak strain. Clinical and
environmental Benidorm isolates had identical SBT patterns.
Conclusion: This is the first time that small fountain without obvious aerosol-generating capability
has been implicated as the source of a LD outbreak. Removal of the fountain halted transmission.
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Background
On average, 1675 cases of legionellosis are reported to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) annu-
ally by state health departments, the majority of which are
Legionnaires' disease (LD) (CDC, unpublished data). It is
estimated that between 8,000 and 18,000 persons are hos-
pitalized with LD in the United States each year, suggest-
ing that under-diagnosis or under-reporting are common
[1]. One species of Legionella, Legionella pneumophila, is
responsible for 90% of reported cases of LD in the United
States and the majority of these are caused by Legionella
pneumophila serogroup 1 (Lp1) [2,3].
Eighty percent of cases of LD are sporadic [4] and the
source of Legionella for these cases is rarely known. In con-
trast, outbreaks, while rare, provide an opportunity to
identify common sources of Legionella. Community LD
outbreaks have frequently been associated with cooling
towers [5-13], and whirlpool spas [14-17], and less fre-
quently with evaporative condensers [18], air-scrubbers
[19], supermarket misters [20], potable water [21,22], and
decorative fountains [23].
In a three week period in June and July 2005, seven cases
of LD among residents of Rapid City were reported to the
South Dakota Department of Health (SDDH). In the pre-
vious 10 years, only two confirmed cases of LD had been
reported to the SDDH from Rapid City. (Personal com-
munication, Dr. Kightlinger) No common exposures
among case-patients were initially apparent. In July 2005,
SDDH and CDC began an epidemiological and environ-
mental investigation to identify the source of the outbreak
and to prevent additional cases.
Methods
Epidemiologic investigation
We defined a case as a resident of, or visitor to, Rapid City,
South Dakota who was diagnosed by a physician, either
clinically or radiographically, with community-acquired
pneumonia (CAP) with onset after May 1, 2005 and who
had laboratory confirmation of LD by culture of
Legionella, by urinary antigen test for Lp1, by a four-fold or
greater rise in serum antibody titer to Lp1, or detection of
specific Legionella antigen by direct fluorescent antibody
staining.
To enhance surveillance for additional cases of LD associ-
ated with Rapid City, alerts regarding the increase in cases
were made locally (July 2005), statewide (July 2005), and
nationwide (August 2005), to public health practitioners,
physicians and health facilities. Clinicians were encour-
aged to perform urine testing for LD for all hospitalized
patients with CAP and to report any cases to SDDH. To
determine whether the increase in cases represented an
outbreak or simply increased diagnostic testing, we exam-
ined trends in admissions for CAP to Rapid City Regional
Hospital, and Legionella urine antigen testing. Hypothesis
generating interviews were held with the first six case-
patients or their surrogates in an attempt to identify any
common exposures.
We conducted a matched case-control study that included
the first 13 of the 18 case-patients to identify exposures
associated with LD. The remaining five case-patients were
not enrolled as they were reported after the source of the
outbreak had been identified and publicized. Four con-
trols per case (n = 52) were matched on underlying illness
category (healthy, underlying illness or immunocompro-
mised) and smoking status. As all enrolled case-patients
were white, older than 50 years, and residents of Rapid
City, we restricted our controls to white persons over the
age of 50 years from Rapid City. Controls were selected
randomly from among persons attending the local hospi-
tal's emergency department within seven days before or
after the illness onset date of the corresponding case-
patient. Potential controls who had a diagnosis of CAP in
the last six months, who were residents of a long-term care
facility, or who had been away from home for five or more
nights during the two weeks of interest were excluded. We
interviewed all case-patients or their surrogates in person
and interviewed controls either in person, or by phone if
they were unwilling to meet an investigator in person.
During interviews with case-patients and controls, we
used a map of Rapid City and a calendar to prompt recall
of activities during each two-week period of interest. Case-
patients and controls were asked to refer to their diaries,
check-books, and receipts to further assist with recall.
Questions were general, such as "did you visit any restau-
rants?" or "did you visit any supermarkets?" If the answer
was in the affirmative then the person was asked to specify
which ones were visited. Reported routes of travel
throughout the city were traced on a map which was
divided into 180 grids, where each grid represented 1.29
km2, and the grid coordinates were recorded.
Matched analysis of the matched sets using exact methods
in SAS version 9.1 (Cary, NC) was used to compute
matched odds ratios (mOR) and 95% confidence inter-
vals (CI).
Environmental investigation
We conducted an environmental assessment of the city to
locate aerosol-generating devices. The devices were identi-
fied by aerial, driving, and walking surveys of the city and
through contacts with city managers, local property man-
agers, water treatment companies, and industrial plumb-
ing contractors. In September 2005, SDDH contracted an
engineering consultant (TK) to assist in the environmen-
tal investigation and remediation efforts. Sample collec-
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tion and analysis were performed according to standard
procedures [24]. Between July and November 2005, 291
environmental samples (201 water, 90 biofilm swabs)
were collected from 123 potential sources at 73 sites
throughout Rapid City. Sampling continued through the
course of the outbreak initially concentrated in the docu-
mented areas of exposure of case-patients. Some sites were
sampled more than once. Potential sources sampled
included cooling towers, chiller units, supermarket mis-
ters, swamp coolers, decorative fountains, whirlpool spas,
the municipal water system, wells and a stream. We also
sampled the potable water system from the first seven
case-patient homes, but as we found only one sample pos-
itive for Legionella, we discontinued this sampling as we
concluded that acute dissemination of Legionella via the
municipal water system was an unlikely explanation for
this outbreak.
A one-liter water sample and, where appropriate, a bio-
film swab were taken from each location. Water samples
were collected in sterile plastic bottles containing a 0.1%
sodium thiosulfate solution. Samples were shipped to the
Legionella Laboratory at CDC (Atlanta, GA) or to the Spe-
cial Pathogens Laboratory, Pittsburgh Veterans Adminis-
tration Medical Center where Legionella was identified
using previously described methods [3]. Clinical and
environmental isolates were compared using monoclonal
antibody (MAb) subtyping [25] and sequence based typ-
ing (SBT) [26].
Research was conducted in compliance with guidelines of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as
they apply to epidemic investigations by the U.S. Public
Health Service, CDC.
Results
Epidemiologic results
Between June 27 and July 18, 2005, SDDH was notified of
seven cases of LD among residents of Rapid City.
Enhanced surveillance detected an additional 11 case-
patients for a total of 18 cases being reported by Novem-
ber 2005. Sixteen case-patients were residents of Rapid
City and two were South Dakota residents who had visited
Rapid City. Fourteen (77.8%) of 18 patients were hospi-
talized, and 1 (5.6%) died. Onset dates ranged over a five-
month period from May 26, 2005 to October 29, 2005
(Figure 1). Ten patients (56%) were men. Ages ranged
from 51 to 88 years (median, 67 years). Eleven (61.1%)
patients had at least one medical risk factor for LD; diabe-
tes mellitus was the most common (n = 7). One patient
was a current smoker and seven were former smokers. The
diagnosis of LD was made for all patients by detection of
Lp1 antigens in urine by enzyme immunoassay (EIA).
Four case-patients were also diagnosed by isolation of Lp1
from respiratory secretions; 3 were Benidorm strain (MAb
pattern 1, 2, 5, 7), a common outbreak strain, and one was
Denver strain (MAb pattern 1, 3, 6), a relatively rare strain
not previously associated with outbreaks (Figure 1). Data
from Rapid City Regional Hospital showed an increase in
Legionella urine antigen tests from November 2004 with
no unusual increase in CAP or LD.
Thirteen of the 18 case-patients and 52 matched controls
were enrolled in the case-control study. The median age of
case-patients was 67 years (range 51–86) compared to 61
years (range 50–92) for controls. All case-patients and
controls were residents of Rapid City and none were cur-
rent smokers. Seven (53.9%) of the 13 case-patients
enrolled in the case-control study had a chronic underly-
ing condition or were immunosuppressed.
Epidemiological curve of case onsets of LD in Rapid City, 2005Figure 1
Epidemiological curve of case onsets of LD in Rapid City, 2005.
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Case-patients were significantly more likely than controls
to have passed through seven map grids (Table 1). Some
of these grids were in, or adjacent to, grids with cooling
towers colonized with Legionella (Figure 2). This initially
supported the hypothesis that a cooling tower was the
source of the outbreak. This was strengthened by the fact
that no two patients lived or worked in the same building
and among the first six case-patients, we could not place
more than two case-patients in any one building or adja-
cent city blocks. Case-patients were not more likely than
controls to have spent time outdoors (Table 1).
Table 1 presents matched odds ratios (mOR) for selected
exposures. Apart from passing through certain map grids,
visiting a restaurant was the only other activity with a sta-
tistically significant odds ratio. Six of 11 case-patients ver-
sus 0 controls (mOR 32.7) reported eating at Restaurant A
during their first interview (information was unavailable
for one case-patient and one case-patient was unsure). Six
of seven case-patients were interviewed by the end of July
and two reported eating at Restaurant A. Nine of 10 case-
patients were interviewed by the end of July and three
reported eating at Restaurant A. Finally, 12 of 13 case-
patients were interviewed by the end of October and six
reported eating at Restaurant A (the mOR is presented for
the 6 of 11 cases who answered the restaurant question).
After the public disclosure of Restaurant A as the source of
the outbreak on October 29, 2005, all case-patients were
re-contacted by SDDH to verify their exposure status and
exposure date, and to ask how long they had spent in the
waiting area where the fountain was located. Controls
were not re-contacted. Simultaneously, some case-
patients were prompted to contact SDDH to say they had
eaten at Restaurant A despite not mentioning this in their
initial interview. Ultimately, 10 (83%) of 13 case-patients
reported eating in Restaurant A within 14 days of their ill-
ness onset (two case-patient reported that they ate at Res-
taurant A but were unsure of when, and one case-patient
was not reported to have eaten in Restaurant A). Of the
five case-patients not enrolled in the case-control study
because they were reported after the fountain had been
removed, all reported eating in Restaurant A. Restaurant A
was located in map grid I8 which had a non-significant
odds ratio (Figure 2).
Environmental results
Legionella was isolated from 43 (35.0%) of 123 potential
environmental sources and from 95 of 291 (32.6%) sam-
ples (Table 2). Legionella pneumophila was the most com-
mon species identified and Lp1 was the predominant
serogroup with 25 (58.1%) of 43 sources positive for Lp1.
Among the Lp1 isolates that were typed, strains reacting
with MAb 1 were most common, suggesting the presence
of type strain Camperdown (MAb 1) and/or Oxford
4032E (MAb 1, 6). Due to a shortage of MAb 6 we were
unable to distinguish between Camperdown and Oxford
for all isolates although the few that were tested were
Oxford.
The outbreak strain, Benidorm (MAb pattern 1, 2, 5, 7),
was isolated from only one source, a decorative fountain
in Restaurant A. Swabs were taken from the fountain
basin, nozzle, and internal lamp and a water sample was
taken. All were positive for Benidorm strain. We com-
pared all Benidorm clinical and environmental isolates
and found identical SBT patterns for the genes flaA, pilE,
asd, mip, mompS, proA, i.e., the pattern 4,7,11,3,11,12,
respectively. The decorative fountain had a water
Legionella colony count of 3000 cfu/ml. Of the remaining
water sources positive for Legionella that had colony
counts recorded, 10 had counts less than 50 cfu/ml, 10
had counts between 50 and 499 cfu/ml, eight had counts
between 500 and 1499 cfu/ml, and three had counts
above 1500 cfu/ml.
Table 1: Matched odds ratio for selected exposures
Activity Cases (%) N = 13* Controls (%) N = 52* Matched OR 95%CI
Passed through grid E3 10/13 (77) 12/52 (21) 10.3 2.1–100.9
Passed through grid E4 9/13 (69) 15/52 (29) 6.8 1.3–68.5
Passed through grid F4 9/13 (69) 12/52 (23) 9.1 1.7–90.9
Passed through grid F5 9/13 (69) 15/52 (29) 12.1 1.5–558.5
Passed through grid F7 11/13 (85) 23/52 (44) 6.5 1.3–65.4
Passed through grid F8 10/13 (77) 18/52 (35) 4.9 1.2–29.3
Passed through grid H6 12/13 (92) 31/52 (60) 12.0 1.3–597.4
>1.5 hours outdoors weekdays 9/13 (69) 30/52 (57) 1.6 0.4–8.0
>1.5 hours outdoors weekends 6/13 (46) 30/52 (57) 0.65 0.2–2.5
Visited any restaurant 13/13 (100%) 29/52 (56) 17.7 2.5–8
Reported eating in Restaurant A on first contact with SDDH 6/11 (55) 0/44 (0) 32.7 4.7–8
Visited any food store 7/13 (54) 38/52 (73) 0.5 0.1–1.9
Visited any medical center 7/13 (54) 43/52 (83) 0.2 0.03–1.1
Traveled on main city thoroughfare 10/12 (83) 33/48 (69) 2.2 0.4–22.0
*Denominators vary as not all case-patients answered all questions or were excluded because they were unsure.
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The decorative fountain located in the lobby of Restaurant
A was sampled on October 24, 2005, turned off at that
time of sampling, and removed a few days later. The diam-
eter of the basin of the fountain was approximately 1.2 m
with a central water column of approximately 30 cm. The
basin was covered with mesh and three colored lights
were submerged in the water (Figure 3). The fountain
operated for 10–12 hours per day. Restaurant A had seat-
ing capacity for 284 people. Case-patients reported a
median of four minutes (range 0.5–17.5 minutes) spent
in the lobby where the fountain was located. No employ-
ees of Restaurant A were reported ill. No cases of LD with
an onset date of more than five days after the date the
fountain ceased operation were reported in Rapid City.
Denver strain, which was identified from one clinical iso-
late, was not identified from any environmental samples.
Discussion
We believe that the source of this outbreak was the deco-
rative fountain in Restaurant A for a number of reasons.
The epidemiological evidence showed that even with poor
case-patient recall the odds ratio from the case-control
study showed a strong association between eating at res-
taurant A and having LD. The environmental investiga-
tion found Benidorm strain in the fountain in Restaurant
A but not in any other potential environmental source. In
addition, the strain isolated from the fountain and the
three patient isolates were identical by SBT analysis. The
colony count observed in the fountain, while very high,
should be viewed as supportive but not decisive evidence
of the fountain being the source.
This outbreak was unusual in that it lasted several
months, a source that on observation appeared to gener-
ate only a small aerosol was implicated, and the case-
patients had very short exposure periods. Previously a dec-
orative fountain located in a hotel lobby was associated
with an outbreak of LD [23] and a decorative fountain in
a restaurant was linked with an outbreak of Pontiac Fever
[27]. In addition, a decorative fountain located outdoors
was the suspected source of an outbreak of LD in Portugal
[28]. These fountains were significantly larger than the
fountain implicated in this outbreak and were likely to
have generated a larger aerosol. The fountain in Restau-
rant A was one of the many potential sources investigated
early in the outbreak. Only sources that had a reasonable
epidemiological link and that were considered to be a
plausible source were sampled. Our initial assessment of
the fountain in Restaurant A in July led us to conclude that
it was an unlikely source because it appeared to generate
very little aerosol, and because at that point only two case-
patients reported having eaten at Restaurant A. Therefore,
it was not sampled at that time but in October when we
found a stronger epidemiological link. The fountain was
reported to be out of operation for approximately 30 con-
secutive days during the time of this outbreak. Although
the exact dates were unavailable to us, they appeared to
correspond with the period on the epidemic curve when
there were no cases. Rather than remediate the fountain in
Restaurant A the fountain was permanently removed.
Our initial hypothesis was that a cooling tower was the
source of this outbreak for three reasons. Firstly, we could
find no common exposures and could not initially place
more than two case-patients in any one building, leading
us to believe that the source was outdoors. Previous stud-
ies have shown infections occurring as far as 6 km from an
external source indicating that the wind is capable of
transporting Legionella plumes [5]. However, exposure to
contaminated cooling tower drift can occur indoors but in
this situation there was no geographical clustering of
patient homes which might have been expected if infec-
tion was as a result of a drift. Secondly, we found several
cooling towers with Legionella in the city close to areas
Table 2: Environmental sources positive for Legionella bacteria
Sources Samples
Potential environmental sources Number investigated Number (%) positive Number collected Number (%) positive
Case-patient homes 7 1 (14.3) 37 1 (2.7)
Cooling towers 43 24 (55.8) 116 68 (58.6)
Chillers 6 5 (83.3) 10 7 (70)
Swamp coolers and sumps 9 5 (55.6) 12 5 (41.7)
Decorative fountains and ornamental 
waterfalls
22 2 (9.1) 42 2 (4.8)
Municipal, local and industrial water sources 22 3 (13.6) 39 6 (15.4)
Supermarket misters 8 2 (25.0) 20 2 (10)
Whirlpool spa 1 0 (0.0) 2 0 (0.0)
Restaurant A
Fountain 1 1 (100) 4 4 (100)
Other water sources 4 0 (0.0) 9 0 (0.0)
Total 123 43 (34.7) 291 95 (32.6)
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where people shopped and worked, and to map grids
through which case-patients were significantly more likely
than controls to have traveled. Apart from exposure to
cooling towers (using map grids as a proxy), analysis of
potential exposures where more than half the case-
patients had visited did not initially show any significant
differences between case-patients and controls. This
hypothesis was strengthened by the timing of the out-
break at the start of summer with many towers bearing
heavier cooling loads and running in excess of 100%
capacity due to a hotter than usual summer in South
Dakota. Thirdly, as outlined in the background, cooling
towers are common sources of community outbreaks of
LD.
Clinicians at the local hospital in Rapid City had adopted
a policy in November 2004 of more intensive diagnostic
testing for patients with CAP so that antibiotic therapy
could be targeted. Legionella urine antigen testing there-
fore increased prior to detection of this outbreak. This
highlights the importance of appropriate diagnostic test-
ing in patients with CAP. While many patients with LD
can be treated successfully and empirically with antibiot-
ics currently recommended for CAP, this outbreak shows
that the use of etiology-specific diagnostic tests can lead to
a public health intervention that prevents future cases of
LD. Furthermore, increasing physician awareness and use
of the urinary antigen testing, through our recommenda-
tion during the outbreak to test all new cases of CAP for
LD, may have improved patient management and con-
tributed to the relatively low case-fatality rate. The availa-
bility of clinical isolates of Legionella from 4 case-patients
was critical in allowing us to identify the source of the out-
break. In the United States there has been a steady decline
in the proportion of LD cases diagnosed by culture since
the introduction of urine antigen testing [2]. However, as
this outbreak demonstrates, diagnostic testing of persons
with CAP should include collection of urine for antigen
testing and respiratory specimens for culture of Legionella
whenever possible. This recommendation is included in
the recently updated Infectious Disease Society of Amer-
ica/American Thoracic Society (IDSA/ATS) guidelines on
the management of CAP in adults [29].
Legionella was cultured from over half (55%) of the cool-
ing towers tested, several of which were positive for Lp1.
Although the outbreak was assumed to be caused by Beni-
dorm strain, which was not found in any of the cooling
towers, the presence of Legionella in so many sources,
some with high colony counts, and with the potential to
aerosolize is worrying. Other studies have shown that
detectable levels of Legionella are present in many cooling
towers and other building water systems [30,31]. Some
researchers advocate measurement of colony counts as a
predictor of disease risk [30]. However, because measure-
ment of colony counts is not standardized, no other
source was initially evident, and because there is no
known safe level of Legionella, we applied the precaution-
ary principle and recommended that all positive towers be
remediated regardless of their colony count. SDDH
employed a Legionella consultant (TK) to manage remedi-
ation of the cooling towers in accordance with published
guidelines [32], and to hold cooling tower maintenance
workshops for industry and businesses in Rapid City and
two other South Dakota cities.
Our investigation had certain limitations. While it is
understandable that individuals recovering from serious
illnesses would have some difficulties with recall of activ-
ities 1 to 2 weeks earlier, poor recall delayed our ability to
identify Restaurant A as a potential source of the outbreak.
We could have asked our case-patients and controls
whether they visited each individual shop, restaurant, etc.
in Rapid City. However, this would have made our already
lengthy questionnaire unwieldy. Case-patients were re-
interviewed about their exposure to Restaurant A but con-
trols were not re-interviewed. Therefore, we have not pre-
sented new matched odds ratios as they may be biased.
Given the magnitude of the odds ratio (mOR 32.7) based
on the initial case-patients' reported attendance at Restau-
rant A and given that the Benidorm strain was found only
in the fountain in Restaurant A, we believe that not re-
interviewing controls has not weakened our conclusions
that the fountain in Restaurant A was the source of this
outbreak. We excluded the last five cases from the case-
control study because they were reported after the source
of the outbreak was published and we were concerned
that their responses may have been biased. We believe
that these cases appeared rather suddenly because media
attention may have led to increased medical care-seeking,
Decorative fountain situated in the lobby of Restaurant AFigure 3
Decorative fountain situated in the lobby of Restaurant A.
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increased diagnostic testing, increased reporting, or all
three.
We were unable to explain the presence of Denver strain
in the clinical isolate of one case-patient. Although this
patient ate at Restaurant A, it is possible that this case-
patient was infected by a different source and was a spo-
radic case unrelated to the outbreak. This assumes that the
case-patients that were not culture confirmed were
infected with Benidorm strain. It is also possible that Den-
ver strain was present in the fountain but was masked by
the predominance of Benidorm strain, or that Denver was
present in the fountain in early August when this case-
patient became ill, but was no longer present in late Octo-
ber when the fountain was sampled. These hypotheses
also make it possible that Benidorm strain may have been
present in cooling towers but was not present at the time
of sampling. If that were the case however, one might have
expected more people who had not eaten at Restaurant A
to be case-patients. We interviewed approximately half of
the controls by phone whereas all case-patients were inter-
viewed in person. This may have led to better recall
among cases. Interviews with controls by phone facili-
tated more rapid recruitment of controls and thus a more
timely analysis.
Most of the fountains we sampled had little or no routine
maintenance although this is recommended by fountain
manufacturers and by the American Society of Heating,
Refrigeration, and Air-conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE).
ASHRAE guidelines are non-specific for fountain mainte-
nance and are not disseminated widely in the restaurant
industry [32]. Proper care and maintenance of ornamen-
tal water fixtures, such as decorative fountains, is essential
to prevent outbreaks of LD and can be achieved by
increasing awareness among fountain operators of the
importance of adequate maintenance.
Conclusion
Small decorative fountains pose a previously unrecog-
nized source of Legionnaires' disease outbreaks as we
believe this is the first time that such a small fountain with
apparently limited aerosol-generating capability has been
implicated as the source of an LD outbreak. Investigations
of future community outbreaks of LD should consider
exposures to indoor decorative fountains, including small
ones such as those that might be present in restaurants,
hotels, or other businesses, as potential sources of
Legionella.
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